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How do planners manage risk in alternative land development models? An 
institutional analysis of land development in the Netherlands
Abstract. While risk is a key concern in property development, it tends to be 
discussed by planners only relative to the effects of regulatory planning on private 
sector risk. Yet planning encompasses a broad range of activities that go beyond its 
function of regulating private sector development. Despite active approaches to land 
development being commonly used across different planning contexts, frameworks 
for analysing public sector strategies to address risk are rarely discussed. We 
attempt to redress this deficit by investigating the actions of public sector 
development actors with regard to risk across three different land development 
models: public land development, land development by public-private partnership, 
and land readjustment. Using recent Dutch experience, we conduct an institutional 
analysis of each land development model in order to highlight the effects of 
alternative governance structures on risk as a particular transaction attribute, from 
the perspective of public sector planning. Our findings indicate the importance of 
highlighting the role of public risk in alternative models of land development where 
there may be a tendency to adopt institutional arrangements without due regard to 
this, and point to possible future applications of institutional analysis at the particular, 
rather than the general, level.
Key words: Risk; Land development models; the Netherlands; Institutional analysis; 
Transaction cost theory.
1. Introduction
Risk is generally discussed with respect to planning in terms of the ability of planning to 
reduce and contain risk in land and property markets (Neutze, 1987; Healey, 1992; 
Leishman et al, 2000). Yet this perspective considers planning only as a regulatory activity, 
whose relationship with risk is defined in terms of its relationship with the property 
development industry. Planning encompasses a much broader range of activities than just 
the regulation of private sector development, with associated consequences for the effect of 
planning on risk in land and property development, including the public risk associated with 
the purchase and sale of land by planning agencies (Allmendinger and Dunse, 2005; Adams 
and Tiesdell, 2010, 2013; Ploegmakers and Van der Krabben, 2012; Adams et al., 2016). 
Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) disaggregate planning into instruments that: ‘shape’ 
markets, by which is meant the setting of the context within which transactions occur, for 
instance through land-use plans; ‘regulate’ markets, for instance through development 
control mechanisms; ‘stimulate’ markets, by facilitating transactions using financial 
incentives such as tax breaks, as well as more interventionist approaches such as land 
assembly; and ‘build capacity’ in markets, through the raising of skills levels and the 
formation of public-private development partnerships. It follows that the relationship between 
planning and risk must be understood not only in relation to planning’s regulatory role but 
with due consideration of the full range of tools and instruments it employs (Ploegmakers 
and Van der Krabben, 2012).
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This heterogeneous definition of planning is evidenced in the process of land development. 
The term ‘land development’ is used to describe the process by which land is acquired, 
assembled into an area suitable to be developed into a predetermined form, and serviced 
with sufficient infrastructure as to support new buildings (Needham and Verhage, 1998; Van 
der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). Land development, which has been used synonymously 
with ‘land management’ (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013), is intimately connected to the 
supply of land for development (Monk et al, 2013), and is distinguished within the overall 
development process from ‘building development’, which describes the process by which 
buildings are constructed on serviced plots (Needham and Verhage, 1998). Van der 
Krabben and Halleux (2011) regard land management strategies as a part of ‘operational 
planning’, as distinct from ‘strategic planning’ and ‘regulatory planning’. Land development 
can be performed entirely by the private sector, but often takes place with public sector 
involvement. This may be due to a desire to achieve planning goals through land 
development or because certain characteristics of the land market can impede private sector 
development, such as fragmented landownership or development risks (Monk et al., 2013).
The uneven spatial distribution of land market characteristics impeding development has, 
combined with institutional contexts that have evolved over time, given rise to different 
models of land development, each involving a different combination of public and private 
action (Needham and Verhage, 1998; Van der Krabben and Halleux, 2011; Van der Krabben 
and Jacobs, 2013). Land development models have tended to be discussed on the basis of 
three objectives (Needham and Verhage, 1998; Van der Krabben and Halleux, 2011; Van 
der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). First, to assemble land into an ownership structure and 
spatial arrangement conducive to the desired form of development. This addresses issues 
such as landowners being unwilling or unable to develop and land in fragmented ownership 
that does not match the shape of the desired new development. Second, to allow the public 
sector to recover planning and infrastructure costs necessitated by the development. Third, 
to capture the value increase that accrues due to a change in land-use or of building density 
permitted; what John Stuart Mill referred to as the ‘unearned increment’ (Fainstein, 2011). 
This last objective has been the subject of intense political debate in many countries, 
including the Netherlands (Van der Krabben, 2018). 
Land development models always involve a trade-off between the achievement of planning 
goals and the level of risk assumed by the public sector in order to reach these. Yet, with a 
few exceptions (Hartmann and Spit, 2015; Savini, 2017), land development models have not 
generally been discussed in terms of the relative levels of public risk that they entail. 
Valtonen et al. (2017), in attempting such a task, examine how planning agencies engaging 
in public land development manage risk. As Valtonen et al. (2017, p.247) note, ‘market risk 
control and its trade-offs with public interests are novel perspectives to approach this [public] 
land development strategy’. We would add that the interrelationships between market risk 
control and public interests are underexplored perspectives from which to view public-private 
relations in the land development process more generally. In this respect we are answering 
the call of Ploegmakers and Van der Krabben (2012, p.171): ‘it is conjectured that different 
forms and combinations of public policy have different impacts on uncertainty reduction, 
although this has not yet been rigorously explored empirically’.
This paper aims to undertake an institutional analysis to investigate the effects of three 
distinct land development models, focusing on the prevalence of risk as a transaction 
attribute from the perspective of public sector planning. We examine the public land 
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development model; the model of land development by public-private partnership; and the 
land readjustment model. These models were selected as being representative of three 
distinct modes of land development in which three discrete combinations of public and 
private action can be discerned, running in a continuum from more to less public involvement 
in land development. In this way we aim to broaden the scope of understandings of risk in 
relation to planning. While the models we consider are by no means practiced 
simultaneously within a range of planning contexts, they represent alternative combinations 
of public and private action that can be proposed as alternative governance structures in 
different planning contexts internationally, according to a process of institutional design. It is 
nevertheless useful to analyse the level of public risk borne in each model within the same 
national planning context. 
There has been considerable interest in institutions and institutional change in planning 
research, reflecting the diversity of institutional approaches (Bolan, 1996; Healey, 1999; 
Buitelaar et al., 2007; Verma 2007; Dembski and Salet, 2010; Moroni, 2010; Sorensen, 
2015; Salet 2018a, 2018b). Transaction cost theory (Alexander 1992, 2001b; Lai, 1994; 
Webster, 1998; Webster and Lai 2003; Buitelaar, 2004) is but one of the many frameworks 
of institutional analysis but is particularly suited to the question addressed in the paper, that 
is to highlight the role of public risk as a transaction attribute in each alternative land 
development model. Transaction cost theory can explain the need for land-use planning and 
development control, but is also useful in the identification of institutional arrangements that 
can raise the effectiveness of planning (Alexander, 2001b). We interpret our selected land 
development models as alternative governance structures that can be applied to the real 
estate development process, as per Alexander’s (2001b, 2001c) framework for institutional 
analysis. Accordingly, we are undertaking a form of what Alexander (2001c) terms 
discriminating alignment, by comparing feasible forms of governance based on their effects 
in raising or lowering transaction costs. The novelty of our approach is that instead of 
seeking to lower transaction costs for all actors, our concern is to highlight the role of public 
risk as a transaction attribute in each alternative land development model.
This paper investigates land development models in the Netherlands, which offers an 
appropriate setting for this investigation for two reasons. First, it is a context in which the 
issue of public risk in land development has over the past decade come to the fore. 
Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the heightened level of public risk attached to 
public land development was drawn attention to, as a number of municipalities found 
themselves with significant land holdings during a dramatic downturn in demand for new 
housing (Van der Krabben, Ploegmakers and Samsura, 2011). Second, and partly as a 
consequence of the first reason, a number of alternative land development models have 
been used in the Netherlands since the dominance of public land development began to 
decline during the early 1990s (Needham, 2007). The effects of the 2008 crisis on housing 
have only reinforced this search for alternative models. If the choice of land development 
model is generally path dependent, it has been suggested that the Netherlands may have 
reached a critical juncture, with a number of alternative land development models remaining 
in use until a new path is followed (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016). As such, the time and 
place of the years following the crisis of 2008 in the Netherlands offer an especially salient 
window into the issue of public risk in the land development process.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss how planning has been influenced by 
theories and methods from economics, using this discussion to frame the conception of 
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planning and markets as interrelated, rather than opposing, spheres (Alexander, 2001a; 
Adams and Tiesdell, 2010; Lord and O’Brien, 2017; Lord and Gu, 2019). Second, we 
consider the relationship between planning and risk, and the treatment of risk by planning 
agencies, noting the potential utility of institutional analysis to address these issues. Third, 
we apply an institutional analysis to three models of land development, as presently 
practiced in the Netherlands. Finally, in our concluding remarks we suggest that an under-
explored and potentially profitable use of institutional analysis may lie in its application at the 
particular level of the singular governance structure or transaction attribute.
2. Breaking the state-market dichotomy in analyses of planning
Neoclassical approaches to the analysis of the effects of planning on land and property 
markets regard planning as a regulatory activity whose sole function is to control supply 
(see, for instance, Cheshire, 2009; Cheshire and Shepherd, 2005; Cheshire et al, 2014; 
Hilber and Vermeulen, 2012; Hilber, 2015). Within the neoclassical framework, land and 
property prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand and the primary 
effect of the planning system is to regulate the supply of developable land. The measurable 
effect of the planning system within this framework is to raise prices by constraining supply 
against increasing demand. Justification for planning within the neoclassical paradigm 
comes from a welfare economics standpoint. Land and property markets are beset by 
inefficiencies and market failures arising from congestion, noise and other external effects 
unaccounted for by the market, leading to a need for correctives that come in the form of 
planning interventions (Evans, 2004), while the need to provide public goods requires a 
mechanism for the planned allocation of these (Klosterman, 1985; Moore, 1978).
This understanding of planning has been fundamentally questioned by New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) approaches, which break the state-market dichotomy. Planning research 
drawing on these approaches has long sought to situate planning as a necessary facilitator 
of land and property markets (Buitelaar, 2003, 2004; Buitelaar and Needham, 2007; Webster 
and Lai, 2003). Alexander (1992) argues that prohibitively high transaction costs in land and 
property markets corresponding to, for example, uncertainty regarding other developers’ 
locational investments and external costs from neighbouring land uses, make necessary 
‘coordinative planning’ in the form of land-use plans. Thus, echoing Coase (1937), 
hierarchical forms of organisation come into being where transaction costs are sufficiently 
high as to inhibit transactions taking place without their coordinative function.
Planning in this view is essential to the effective and efficient functioning of land and property 
markets (Allmendinger and Dunse, 2005; Adams and Tiesdell 2010; 2013; Adams and 
Watkins, 2014). Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) disaggregate planning into the numerous 
forms of activity undertaken by the state with the aim of achieving public policy goals in and 
through urban development, identifying the ability of plans and strategies to ‘shape’ markets, 
market regulation, market stimulus through planned interventions, and capacity building as 
key tools and instruments of the planning apparatus. Lord and O’Brien (2017) meanwhile 
argue that planning effectively performs the role of a ‘market maker’ for land and property 
markets, a catalysing intermediary that animates the development process. This challenge to 
the characterisation of planning as solely a regulatory activity with negative implications for 
land and property markets draws on a heterogeneous body of economic theory, 
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encompassing NIE, welfare economics, behavioural economics and the social construction 
of markets (Adams and Watkins, 2014; Adams et al., 2016).
Where neoclassical analyses of the effects of planning focus on the measurable economic 
costs of supply constraints, NIE approaches focus on transaction costs, or those costs 
accrued in the reduction of uncertainty through the gathering of information (Buitelaar, 2004). 
Transaction cost theory has been applied to the land development process within the 
framework of institutional analysis, in which particular forms of governance, containing 
specific combinations of state-market interaction, are analysed in order to ascertain their 
effects on transaction costs (Alexander, 2007). Institutions in this approach are commonly 
defined as formal and informal rules of the game that form an external context to the 
transactions under investigation (e.g. Buitelaar, 2004) as opposed to more dynamic 
sociological definitions (see for an extensive discussion of institutional approaches Dembski 
and Salet, 2010). Most theorists in this strand of institutional analysis have an instrumental 
understanding of institutions, which is expressed in the idea that institutions can be designed 
based on a better understanding of the transactions of a particular market (Alexander, 
2001c, 2005).
Empirical applications of transaction cost theory to planning have taken the form of 
institutional analyses of the development process in particular instances. As much as some 
NIE theorists focus on its general applicability (for instance Schotter, 1981), it is as a partial 
explanation that the NIE has been applied in planning and property development (Needham 
et al, 2011). Two such examples are Alexander’s (2001c) institutional analysis of the Israeli 
system of land-use planning and development control, and Buitelaar’s (2004) institutional 
analysis of the land development process in the Netherlands. Both authors take a similar 
approach, dividing the development process into stages and analysing the transactions that 
occur at each stage, their involved parties and their associated transaction costs. The 
purpose of this analysis is to enable what Williamson (1999) calls ‘remediability’: the 
comparison and selection of a set of institutional rules or governance structures on the basis 
of their effectiveness in achieving a particular public policy.
3. Planning and risk 
Planning must deal with a variety of risks related to development, including disaster risk in 
the international development field (Wamsler, 2006) and flood risk in land allocations (Van 
Herk et al, 2011). Our concern is with financial risk associated with the development 
process. Risk is a key facet of the development process and the property development 
industry is centrally concerned with risk management in the conversion of development 
potential into profit (RICS, 2008). Whereas uncertainty denotes an inability to assign a 
probability to one among a range of outcomes, risk refers to the measurable probability of a 
particular negative outcome occurring. The conversion of uncertainty into risk is an important 
function of markets (Van der Krabben, 1995), but is less closely associated with hierarchical 
forms of organisation, such as planning. Where planning is considered with regard to its 
effect on risk in the development process it is generally from the perspective of the risks that 
planning imposes on developers and, correspondingly, of what planning can do to lower 
levels of risk for developers (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001; Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005; Ball, 
2011).
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Yet, as noted in Section 2, this regulatory function is but one of a range undertaken under 
the banner of planning (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010, 2013). Adams and Tiesdell (2013, 
p.279), discuss the ‘risk-reducing actions’ that the public sector can take with regard to 
private development using a broader understanding of what constitutes planning, including 
the delivery of accurate market information, the provision of policy stability, the 
implementation of demonstration projects and place management initiatives. Similarly, Adair 
et al (1998, p.16), in the context of regeneration, point to the ability of the public sector to 
build confidence in the market by engaging in such activities as providing a guaranteed 
minimum standard of infrastructure, ensuring clarity in policies and processes, targeting 
initiatives, using simplified planning processes, and land assembly.
In explaining how risk is accounted for in decision-making, neoclassical economics uses 
expected utility theory, while behavioural economics has proposed prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  We explore the role of institutions and, specifically, 
transaction cost theory, as an alternative to these. Institutions are a means to reduce 
uncertainty and thereby raise the reliability of our expectations (Verma, 2007), while 
transactions in the land development process involve significant, long-term commitments 
that are subject to a high degree of uncertainty (Alexander, 2007). Accordingly, institutional 
design has been proposed as a means to identify those governance structures that reduce 
transaction costs, of which uncertainty is a significant component, for all participating actors 
(Alexander, 2001c). Yet investigations into institutional change have found that institutional 
design cannot always explain how institutions are selected in given empirical contexts 
(Buitelaar et al., 2007, 2014). An alternative explanation that has been offered is that of 
‘punctuated equilibrium’, in which institutional continuity is path dependent, but where 
institutional change occurs at critical junctures (Sorensen, 2017). Buitelaar and Bregman 
(2016) argue that Dutch planning may presently be at just such a critical juncture, following a 
prolonged period of crisis and recession.
Our investigation adopts the form of institutional analysis, in which alternative forms of 
governance are compared for their relative suitability for a particular market process. 
Institutional analysis is undertaken to inform institutional design, which Alexander (2007, 
p.49) defines as ‘the devising and realisation of rules, procedures and organisational 
structures that will enable and constrain behaviour and action so as to accord with held 
values, achieve desired objectives, accomplish set purposes or execute given tasks’. The 
purpose of this paper is to use transaction cost theory to inform an institutional analysis that 
draws attention to distributions of risk between public and private actors in alternative land 
development models. 
Transaction cost theory identifies attributes of transactions that may lead to distorted market 
outcomes and focuses on how these attributes affect how markets work. Alexander (2001b), 
drawing on Williamson (1999), identifies transaction attributes that affect transaction costs 
due to their propensity to expose market participants to various hazards, among which 
uncertainty and risk are prominent. Asymmetric distributions of information regarding, for 
instance, the development potential of a site or the strategies of other market actors can lead 
to the hazard of opportunistic behaviour and raise transaction costs for some participants. 
Similarly, moral hazards can arise where risks can be shifted to other market actors. 
Transaction costs also arise where transactions are interdependent and repetitive, where 
there is the hazard that ‘lock-in’ can occur and market entry costs are raised. Risk and 
uncertainty thus represent a key issue within planning that is addressed by transaction cost 
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theory, but which has not been the focus of institutional analyses of planning and 
development.
4. The effects of alternative land development models practiced in the Netherlands on 
public risk
We follow the approach outlined in Section 3 that has been used by Alexander (2001c) in the 
case of the Israeli planning system and by Buitelaar (2004) to examine the development 
process in the Netherlands. We adapt this approach, however, to analyse the effects of 
alternative land development models on a particular transaction attribute (that of risk and 
uncertainty) from the perspective of one party in the development process (the public 
sector). This research strategy allows us to examine each model as it is practiced within the 
same legal and national policy context for planning. The selection of the Netherlands is due 
to its accommodation of each of these land development models within a single such 
context, as well as its being a planning context in which an awareness of public sector risk in 
planning has been raised over the past decade, following the effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008 (Valtonen et al., 2017). The analysis has implications for planning elsewhere, 
however, to the extent that its primary purpose is to address alternative land development 
models that are, or have the potential to be, applied in different planning contexts.
Our analysis of each land development model takes the form of a description of how each 
model operates presently in the Netherlands followed by an analysis of the how transaction 
costs are raised or lowered according to hazards associated with risk and uncertainty with 
respect to the public sector. Each land development model we investigate is set out 
alongside its purpose, mode of land assembly, incidence within Dutch planning, the 
transaction costs particular to the model, and allocation of risk between public and private 
sector agents, in Table 1.
The study is informed by ten semi-structured interviews with academics and actors from the 
planning and property development industries, supplemented with a review of the planning 
literature relating to each model. Interviewees were selected on a non-statistical, purposeful 
basis, intended to cover both analytical and practice perspectives. Interview data was 
analysed thematically, within the context of a largely deductive investigation. This was done 









Purpose Incidence within 
Dutch planning 
Transaction costs in 
which public risk is 
raised
Risk allocation between 
public and private sectors 
Public land 
development
To deliver new 
development in 




costs and some 
surplus value.
‘Traditional’ mode of 
land development in 
the Netherlands, 
dominant between 
World War Two and 
the mid-1990s.
Project conception; land-
use plan preparation; land 





Majority of risk lies with 
public sector. Public sector 
bears long-term risk of land 
development; private sector 








To ‘re-insert’ a 
specific area into 
the property 
market in a way 
that achieves 
planning goals 
usually relating to 
urban 
regeneration, 
and/or to share 
risk between 
public and private 
parties.
Originally used in 
urban regeneration, 
but since used in 
different forms as 
adaptations to VINEX 





land purchase and/or 
pooling arrangements; 
contract preparation for 
joint ventures; negotiated 
land-use plan preparation; 
cost recovery.
Risk is shared, but majority 
of risk lies with public sector. 
Public involvement in land 
assembly and infrastructure 






development of a 




with land readjustment 
in the Netherlands, 
introduced in 2014.
Project promotion; 
facilitation of readjustment 
plan; land-use plan 
adjustment; cost recovery.
Risk is shared between 
landowners. Public risk of 
failure to deliver new 
development. Public sector 
takes on risk where public 
infrastructure is built.
4.1 Public land development
Public land development involves the acquisition of land and its servicing with infrastructure 
by the public sector before being divided into plots and sold to private sector developers. 
The degree of risk assumed by the public sector in public land development is substantial, 
and that taken on by private sector developers is relatively minimal (Needham and Verhage, 
1998; van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013; Valtonen et al, 2017). Public land development 
was, for half a century, the dominant model of land development in the Netherlands, with 
municipalities generally adopting an ‘active’, development-led land policy. By the mid-1990s, 
persistently low interest rates, a relaxation of mortgage lending, and a rapid increase in the 
number of households, all combined to raise demand for owner-occupied housing. Alongside 
this, municipalities’ traditional approach, of setting sale prices for serviced plots to enable 
cost recovery plus a small profit, was contested by the argument that a greater level of profit 
would enable the provision of better public facilities. This argument was to be facilitated by 
deliberately slowing the supply of land in order to raise its price and was put into practice in 
the national urbanisation strategy known as VINEX during the 1990s. The increase in prices 
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for developable land drew interest from housebuilders, as the development gains began to 
exceed the risks of land development (Needham, 2007). Since the 1990s the share of new 
housing delivered through an active land policy has declined rapidly against completions 
delivered by public-private partnerships, though public land development continues to be 
practiced at a smaller scale (Tennekes, 2018).
Since public land development requires the municipality to acquire and assemble all land for 
development, the great majority of risk in this transaction is assumed by the public sector. 
Pre-emption rights and compulsory purchase are viable in land assembly (providing a land-
use plan is in place), thus minimising risk for the municipality as part of the land purchase 
transaction, though these are only sparingly used, being viewed as complex and time-
consuming (Korthals Altes, 2014). As per Alexander (2001b), the most important factor in 
land acquisition is the land value, which is representative of the development potential of the 
site, which in turn is heavily dependent upon land-use change on neighbouring sites and in 
the surrounding area. In the Netherlands land-use plans are not generally prepared for the 
whole of a municipality but, under public land development, sites are typically of a large 
scale, such that they dominate the land-use pattern of the wider area, thereby lowering the 
risk of neighbourhood effects. The municipality’s responsibility for project conception and 
development plan preparation, while generating transaction costs, creates information on 
development potential and provides certainty in determining neighbourhood effects. While 
the municipality’s control over land-use designations and small-scale infrastructure in the 
wider area should theoretically give it an information advantage over private developers with 
whom it competes for land, this is not presently widely exploited as public land development 
at scale has been usurped by land development by public-private partnership. 
Under public land development the preparation of land for development and parcelisation is 
undertaken entirely by the municipality, requiring procurement of contractor and consultant 
services. These transactions tend to be durable, as the development process can take 
several years, and repetitive, where municipalities are keen to use trusted service providers. 
This raises the issue of ‘asset specificity’, in which assets are not substitutable and market 
actors become interdependent (Alexander, 2001b), and may raise transaction costs related 
to the coordination of market participants. Opportunism on the part of some actors may also 
arise where procurement is insufficiently open. Similar issues can arise at the land disposal 
stage, where municipalities prefer to use large-scale developers. The preference for 
particular private firms does, however, have the advantage of causing public and private 
sectors to work together to reduce risk in the property market.
 
4.2 Land development by public-private partnership 
The transition from a land policy focused primarily on public land development to one 
focused on public-private development was triggered by a shift in land ownership from the 
1990s onwards as municipalities were unable to acquire land for development as they had 
done previously, as noted in Section 4.1. Yet this inability to acquire land has not led Dutch 
municipalities to adopt the passive position of local authorities in many other countries, by 
preparing a land-use plan that developers must adhere to, thereby lowering their transaction 
costs in development conception and land acquisition. Instead, the longstanding obligation 
of municipalities to not only supply land but to deliver development (Van der Krabben and 
Jacobs, 2013) has resulted in the formation of public-private development partnerships, as 
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municipalities have sought a means by which to continue their active land policy without 
necessarily undertaking public land development. While transaction costs are raised by the 
need for negotiation, the tendency towards interdependence, and the possibility of 
information asymmetries working in favour of the private developer, risk of project failure is 
pooled between public and private sectors. Two models of public-private partnership are 
prevalent. In the building claim model private landowners sell their land to the municipality on 
the condition that they will receive in return the option to buy, at an agreed price, serviced 
plots. In the joint venture model, the municipality and the private landowner pool their land 
within a private company and develop it together, thereby eliminating the land disposal stage 
of development for the municipality.
Land assembly entails either the public purchase of land from landowners, in the building 
claim model, or the transfer of ownership into a joint venture. In the case of the building 
claim model negotiations over price take place, as the land transaction is not straightforward, 
while in the joint venture model contracts must be drawn up to incorporate the newly created 
venture. In the building claim model risk is pooled only if the transfer of ownership contract 
between the landowner and the municipality guarantees that the landowners will exercise 
their option to buy. In the joint venture model risk is pooled according to the proportions in 
which land and investment are pooled. In both cases negotiations take place over the layout 
of the site and the necessary infrastructure. Landowners are keen to be involved in plan 
preparation because the plan gives them certainty and because it represents an opportunity 
to raise the value of their development. Negotiated plans thus raise transaction costs for all 
parties and may increase levels of uncertainty where information asymmetries exist. Yet 
their effect on the overall development is to lower risk by guaranteeing what can be built and 
they may also raise the value of the development.
Negotiations also usually take place over the costs of infrastructure, which are generally 
agreed by private contract though which may be recovered by public law where the 
municipality has a land-use plan and contribution plan already in place. Both municipalities 
and private developers prefer to negotiate infrastructure costs using private contracts, in 
spite of this serving to increase their transaction costs and their associated project risks. 
While municipalities are thus inclined because they are limited by public law as to the type 
and scale of costs they can impose via contribution plans, private developers value the 
control over the scheme and its associated costs that negotiation allows. As noted in Section 
4.1, part of the reason why municipalities assume the substantial risks associated with public 
land development is that it brings the reward of value capture, alongside the achievement of 
planning goals. While development by public-private partnership lowers the overall project 
risk for the municipality, it also lowers the scope for value capture, which must be shared 
with private actors. Interestingly, the shift in geographical focus of development from 
greenfield to brownfield sites that has occurred with the transition from public to public-
private development has also affected the attitude of municipalities with regard to value 
capture.
‘The other reason that municipalities don’t care so much about surplus value is that 
with the shift to brownfield development there’s not so much surplus value to be made. 
And I think that one of the big issues for planning in the Netherlands is that, if we 
continue to shift to brownfield development, the problem will not be so much that there 
is not enough surplus value, but that there won’t be enough profitable developments 
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anymore. That’s a discussion that isn’t taking place yet, but when I speak to people in 
city governments, they all agree.’ (Interview, planning academic.)
Given that municipalities are responsible for supplying a sufficient quantity of housing as to 
meet prevalent need, when they opt to deliver this through partnership with private 
developers, via negotiated plans, they imbue their negotiations with the risk that, should they 
fail, housing supply goals will not be met. Partially counteracting this responsibility is the 
upper hand that municipalities hold with regard to land-use plan approval. The approval of 
the land-use plan for project development is a sovereign task, therefore as much as the plan 
can be negotiated by public and private actors, plan approval can be used as a bargaining 
chip by municipalities in negotiation, raising the possibility of moral hazard.
 
4.3 Land readjustment
Land readjustment – sometimes termed reparcelisation, replotting, land pooling, or land 
consolidation – is a model of land development that aims primarily to create plot layouts 
suitable for development but is also used to facilitate land assembly as a stage in land 
development (Dietrich et al, 1993). Where land development is inhibited by a sub-optimal 
configuration of plots, land readjustment allows for plots to be rearranged and/or 
consolidated in order to facilitate their redevelopment into more economically or socially 
profitable use. This is achieved by the pooling of land from a given number of plots and its 
redistribution among landowners, who either gain more value than they had prior to the 
exercise or are compensated for value lost. Redistribution can be according to either plot 
values or sizes. Land readjustment is thus a land development model that turns not on the 
public ownership and/or development of land but on the adjustment of property rights over 
the private ownership and use of land. The use of land readjustment in the Netherlands is 
longstanding, having been applied to agricultural land there since 1924 (Needham, 2007), 
but land readjustment has only recently been experimented with in urban areas, following 
central government’s establishment of a committee to explore its potential application in 
2013 and has been included as an instrument in the forthcoming Environment and Planning 
Act. In the proposed Dutch model, land readjustment is a voluntary exercise involving 
negotiation among landowners, in which risk and reward are thus shared among landowners 
according to land or capital invested.
That urban land readjustment in the Netherlands is a voluntary exercise undertaken by 
landowners (usually in partnership with private developers in the guise of an ‘implementation 
agency’) might imply that transaction costs associated with project conception are zero for 
the municipality. In fact, around ninety of the hundred cases completed in the first year of the 
pilot programme involved municipalities taking a lead role at an early stage in the process 
(interview, Land Registry Senior Officer). This inevitably raises transaction costs for the 
municipality but may ultimately lower the risk that insufficient housing is delivered there, 
reflecting the municipality’s role in housing delivery.
A fundamental feature of land readjustment is that land acquisition is absent from, but land 
assembly is facilitated by, the model. Indeed, transaction costs associated with land 
assembly issues of the first mover problem, the free rider problem and the holdout problem 
are addressed by land readjustment (Lord and O’Brien, 2017). Transaction costs for land 
acquisition are therefore zero, though transaction costs for land assembly can be extremely 
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high, in spite of this being an aim of the model, because of the voluntary nature of urban land 
readjustment in the Netherlands. Where land readjustment is mandatory, as is the case in 
Germany, the readjustment plan has been formulated independently of the owners by a land 
readjustment committee operating at arm’s length from local government, and landowners 
receive a new plot of land in the readjustment plan whether they agree to the exercise or not 
(Davy, 2007; Muñoz Gielen, 2016). In the Netherlands it is the landowners who must 
negotiate amongst themselves in order to draw up the readjustment plan. Where there is 
clear potential for land value uplift for all landowners following the implementation of the 
plan, negotiation may prove to be relatively straightforward, but where the existence of such 
potential is in doubt, the redevelopment may be obstructed.
‘The transaction costs are a pretty interesting feature in this deal making scenario, 
because if you have a situation in which you can create a lot of new value, it’s not so 
difficult to make a deal with each other. If you have a case in which there is a lot of 
negative value, the deal won’t happen, unless there are other reasons, such as social 
aims … The interesting part is that you have cases that are hanging in the balance; 
they are a little bit negative or a little bit positive, they are around zero, and by lowering 
transaction costs you can make them possible. For instance, by lowering taxes or you 
can say, well we have a law which says that if you develop real estate you have to pay 
a certain amount of money towards infrastructure, like public spaces, but if you make a 
deal that achieves social aims [already], so that there is less empty real estate or the 
area is safer, you won’t have to pay towards public works. Local government will pay 
itself.’ (Interview, Land Registry Senior Officer.)
In those cases where development potential hangs in the balance, the lowering of 
transaction costs via the municipality bringing landowners and developers together and 
contributing to the exploration of development options may encourage development. This 
points to the market supportive role played by the municipality in urban land readjustment in 
the Netherlands, wherein it promotes projects, facilitates landowner negotiations, adjusts 
land-use plans where necessary and may implement infrastructure. Ultimately though, the 
municipality takes a passive, rather than its usual active, role in the development process.
‘It’s a process so [landowners] need guidance in this process, they often need the 
municipality to give approval to the plans, and also it’s not their core business. Their 
business is not urban development, it’s making cars or whatever, so they’re not 
experts, and they have to do it in their spare time, so they need help. Otherwise it 
won’t happen, because it’s very complicated, [in terms of the] deal making.’ (Interview, 
Land Registry Senior Officer.)
Where development gains are small but there are social gains to be made, the role of the 
public sector can expand to lower developer contributions to infrastructure investments. 
Where significant surplus value is created by land development, agreements between the 
public and private sector can be easily arrived at. But where little or no surplus value is 
generated but significant public gains can be made, development that would not otherwise 
proceed can be stimulated by public sector investment. The public sector thus maintains its 
role as the animator of development where it considers the potential for the achievement of 
planning goals to be attractive.
The municipality also maintains an active role in cost recovery and land-use plan 
adjustment. The costs of redevelopment are paid for by the implementation agency but must 
be agreed by the municipality, either by private contract or public law, in the latter case as 
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part of a development contribution plan. Where costs are agreed by private contract, there is 
the possibility that the landowners can negotiate to reduce these, though in such a 
circumstance the municipality is able to veto the redevelopment by refusing to grant a 
necessary change to the land-use plan.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper applied an application of institutional analysis drawn from Alexander’s (1992, 
2001b, 2001c) transaction cost theory of land-use planning to the specific aim of 
investigating the effects of alternative land development models (or governance structures in 
Alexander’s terminology) on risk as a transaction attribute. Taking our selected development 
models in turn, we discussed how each lowered or raised levels of risk and uncertainty for 
transactions in the land development process from the perspective of the public sector. We 
undertook our investigation using three land development models – public land 
development, land development by public-private partnership, and land readjustment – as 
they are presently practiced within the same legal and policy context – the Netherlands – in 
order to control for exogenous variables that differ across national contexts. Although our 
investigation focuses on a single country, our approach of comparing alternative land 
development models within a single piece of institutional analysis, as well as our use of 
institutional analysis to examine the effects of different governance structures on a particular 
transaction attribute, are novel adaptations of existing research in institutional analysis. 
Where empirical studies employing transaction cost theory have been limited by the difficulty 
of gathering quantitative data on transaction costs, the utility of institutional analysis may be 
in its heuristic value, in the sense that the identification of transaction costs can enable us to 
compare alternative means of process coordination or governance (Buitelaar, 2004). Given 
that our ability to study transaction costs appears to be limited to their identification and 
comparison, it follows that a useful avenue for the further application of institutional analysis 
might be found in studying the particular, rather than the general. Future applications of 
institutional analysis in planning might therefore focus on particular planning instruments or 
on the prevalence of particular transaction attributes in the application of these.
The Global Financial Crisis has raised awareness of the significant public sector risks in land 
development, which has affected all forms where the public sector was the major landowner. 
This increased awareness of public risk has led to a reassessment of the role of the state in 
land development in the Netherlands, and a search for alternative models in which public 
risks can be minimised (van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). The suggestion of Buitelaar 
and Bregman (2016) that Dutch planning, following the 2008 crisis, may be at a critical 
moment for institutional change points to the potential importance of the role played by 
institutional design against a background of institutional path dependence. This paper 
highlights the importance of institutional analysis as a means of recognising and 
understanding the role played by planning institutions in allocating risk between public and 
private market participants in the land development process. It is argued that institutional 
analysis can in this way be used by public sector planning agencies to inform the generation 
of institutional designs that aim specifically to minimise public risk, alongside the 
conventional aim of institutional design, to lower transaction costs (and therefore uncertainty) 
for all stakeholders. 
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